index.md (18068B)
1 +++ 2 title = "A Review That I Should Probably Have Saved For Another, Less Contentious Time But Nevertheless Did and Ultimately Enjoyed" 3 date = 2023-12-16 4 [extra] 5 book = "The War of Return" 6 author = "Adi Schwartz and Einat Wilf" 7 finished = 2023-12-03 8 rating = "★★★★☆" 9 +++ 10 11 *The War of Return* is a book written by two self-described "prominent 12 Israeli leftists" that makes a bold claim in its subtitle: "Western 13 Indulgence of the Palestinian Dream Has Obstructed the Path to 14 Peace."[^1] The book was originally published, in Hebrew, in 2018. The 15 English translation debuted two years after in 2020. Three years later, 16 and three months after the October 7th attacks, those who hope for peace 17 seem to have more reason for despair than ever. I read *War of Return* 18 hoping for a fresh perspective. So together, let’s turn to co-authors 19 Adi Schwartz—an Israeli journalist formerly at Haaretz, the country’s 20 largest left-wing newspaper—and Einat Wilf—a former Labor party 21 politician—to discuss "the single largest obstacle to lasting peace" and 22 how we might go about solving this seemingly intractable conflict 23 capturing the attention of the world.[^2] 24 25 <!-- more --> 26 27 ## The Narrative of the Conflict, as Recounted in *War of Return* 28 ### You Probably Think You Know What the Arab-Israeli Conflict Is 29 The Arab-Israeli conflict, stretching now for over seven decades and 30 continuing to impact the lives of millions of people throughout the 31 Middle East, has had numerous near misses with peace. This is because of 32 a fundamentally incorrect assumption often held by Israeli and Western 33 negotiators that “this [is] a territorial conflict that [can] be solved 34 by partitioning the land into two states, that the Palestinians only 35 [want] a state of their own in the territories, and that the Israeli 36 occupation and the settlements [are] the primary obstacle preventing 37 peace.”[^3][^4] According to Schwartz and Wilf, they have misunderstood 38 the problem. 39 40 In reality, our favorite co-authors say, this is an ideological conflict 41 over the very existence of Israel. It is an absolute rejection of 42 minority sovereignty in a region dominated by the Arabs, and it is not 43 new: “…the belief that Zionism was an outrageous injustice predated the 44 war and caused the Arabs to violently oppose the Jewish national 45 liberation movement many decades earlier.”[^5] The territorial framing 46 of the conflict is thus not conducive to a solution—no state, with any 47 borders, will appease a movement that feels like partition itself is an 48 injustice. 49 50 > ...this was not a conflict between two national movements, each 51 > seeking first and foremost its own independence, but rather about one 52 > group (the Arabs) seeking first and foremost to foil the independence 53 > of another (the Jews).[^6] 54 55 ### What Does That Have to Do with Refugees? 56 Palestinians' claimed right of return, in the minds of Schwartz and 57 Wilf, is a deceptively named aspiration to negate Jewish 58 self-determination. There can be no democratic Jewish sovereignty where 59 Jews are a minority.[^7] It is thus that the Palestinian right of return 60 is "not merely about moving ten or twenty miles to homes left behind, 61 but primarily about returning to the time before the terrible defeat of 62 the Nakba and the establishment of the state of Israel," by making Jews 63 a minority in their own homeland.[^8] In essence, it is about rewinding 64 history and undoing the creation of the Jewish state. 65 66 I myself misunderstood what was meant by "right of return" before 67 reading this book. As the phrase is used, the right of return is the 68 right of Palestinians to return not to a future Palestinian state in the 69 West Bank and Gaza—as I had believed, and supported—but in fact, to the 70 sovereign state of Israel. Return "could only be realized in the 71 territory of the state of Israel atop the ruins of the Jewish right of 72 self-determination.”[^9] To mandate a right of return to Israeli 73 territory is to reject "the principle of territorial partition" and a 74 two-state solution.[^10] 75 76 *War of Return* attributes the creation of the refugee issue to this 77 rejection of the two-state solution by the Arabs. They argue that if the 78 Arabs had accepted partition in 1948 and established a state of their 79 own, no one would have been displaced:[^11] 80 81 > ...it is a fact that the departure of the Arabs was a result of the 82 > war and only of the war. Before the Arabs waged war against partition, 83 > they did not leave their homes. The Arab flight and the refugees from 84 > the war were neither inevitable nor necessary nor inherent in 85 > Zionism.[^12] 86 87 The blame for the displacement of the refugees, they claim, is 88 unflinchingly on the shoulders of the Arabs, not the Jews. No one is 89 entitled to the status quo ante: 90 91 > Those who wage war to eliminate another people, and to prevent their 92 > achieving independence, cannot legitimately complain that “they 93 > suffered an exceptional injustice” when they lose and flee the 94 > land.[^13] 95 96 Furthermore, according to Schwartz and Wilf, the legal right of return 97 simply does not exist: "No legal obligation or treaty existed that... 98 obliged Israel to let [Palestinians] return to its territory" in the 99 aftermath of the 1948 war.[^14] Flight and expulsions occurred 100 throughout the 20th century, including during this seminal war. Indeed, 101 unlike in Israel where an Arab minority remained after the war, "not a 102 single Jew remained in the areas conquered by Arab forces."[^15] 103 104 How can it be that the Palestinian refugee problem still exists 75 years 105 later, and at a greater scale than its start? "The answer to why the 106 Palestinian refugee problem still exists lies neither in the conditions 107 of its birth nor in its scale nor in the number of victims: nothing here 108 is unique. The answer must lie elsewhere."[^16] That elsewhere, *War of 109 Return* posits, is in the refusal of the Arabs "to solve the [conflict] 110 by creating a new status quo in the Middle East" in which Jews and Arabs 111 could have exercised self-determination side-by-side—which was 112 accomplished through the political manipulation and exacerbation of the 113 Palestinian refugee issue.[^17] 114 115 ### The Tragic Ensuing Decades 116 Schwartz and Wilf argue that the critical issue is the Palestinians' 117 demand for return to Israel. Progress toward peace is made on all fronts 118 but return, the "one article that Israel [can] absolutely not agree to, 119 as it [entails] its very suicide."[^18] Return is instead silently 120 propped up by Arab support—all but guaranteeing a continued, violent 121 existence for Palestinians and all others in the region. Promising 122 initiatives to resettle hundreds of thousands of refugees in the 123 immediate aftermath of the 1948 war, in the Jordan Valley and the Sinai, 124 went nowhere. The "biggest rehabilitation project of the 1950s for 125 Palestinian refugees," a farm run by Musa Alami (a prominent Palestinian 126 nationalist), employed thousands of Palestinians in the Jericho 127 area—with a specific focus on orphans of the war—and grew orchards and 128 productive crops over thousands of dunams, with export contracts to 129 Saudi Arabia, fifty wells, and a school.[^19] It was leveled in 1955 by 130 Palestinians believing its existence would help "enable the resolution 131 of outstanding political disputes between the sides."[^20] 132 133 The refugee issue, claim Schwartz and Wilf, is cynically manufactured 134 and perpetuated by Arab leaders. The long-term adoption of the position 135 that "improving the living conditions of a few hundreds of thousands of 136 refugees [is] less important than their war with Zionism" has led the 137 Arab world to the creation of a Palestinian refugee-hood that is 138 completely divorced from the experience of every other refugee 139 group.[^21] Indeed, Palestinian refugees are not governed by UNHCR, the 140 UN agency for refugees, but by their own temporary commission—UNRWA—the 141 regular extension of which "has become a quasi-automatic annual 142 tradition" at the United Nations.[^22] *War of Return* devotes a great 143 amount of effort to describing how UNRWA "was transformed from being a 144 failed agency for refugee rehabilitation to a very successful 145 organization for" halting progress in the Middle East.[^23] "For 146 decades," Schwartz and Wilf say, "UNRWA has sustained a parallel world 147 of policy and executive decisions that serve the Palestinian narrative 148 alone," and leave the Middle East in a radicalizing limbo that actively 149 works against peace.[^24] 150 151 The list of UNRWA oddities is very, very long. Unlike all other groups, 152 UNRWA's "Palestine refugee" status is hereditary—resulting in a 153 registered population of over 5 million people from an initial group of 154 approximately 700,000 displaced Palestinians (see chart below). Unlike 155 all other groups, refugee status is not surrendered when additional 156 citizenship is achieved; indeed, 2.2 million UNRWA-registered refugees 157 are citizens of Jordan, but they retain their "refugee" status. 158 Astoundingly, these refugees make up 70% of Jordan's population: "It is 159 difficult, bordering on impossible, to get a consistent answer from 160 Jordanian officials to the question of how the Jordanian state sees its 161 own citizens."[^25] Another 2.2 million UNRWA-registered refugees live 162 in the West Bank and Gaza, territories allocated for the future 163 Palestinian state, making them refugees within their own future state. 164 An additional million are officially split between Syria and Lebanon, 165 territories where "most of them do not even reside... anymore."[^26] 166 Since the 1960s, "most of the [Palestinian] refugee camps were 167 neighborhoods of the Arab towns next to which they were built," with 168 housing markets and daily realities entirely different from the Western 169 image of vast, impoverished tent cities.[^27] Within these 170 refugee-camps-that-are-cities, Western-funded UNRWA-run schools teach 171 students "a narrative of victimhood, based on a singular, striking 172 injustice," which have resulted over time, Schwartz and Wilf believe, in 173 a direct connection between "the perpetuation of UNRWA for political 174 reasons to the emergence of" Palestinian terrorism.[^28] Thus, according 175 to Schwartz and Wilf, the purpose of the continued use and expansion of 176 refugee status in this situation is to perpetuate and reinforce the Arab 177 claim toward the right of return and its inherent goal of eliminating 178 Israel.[^29] 179 180  182 183 ## So, Should You Read It? 184 185 *The War of Return* is worth reading, but is difficult to synthesize. 186 The book is disorganized: it has a message it wishes to impress upon 187 you, but is not sufficiently clear and driven in doing so. It is without 188 a doubt the most thoroughly cited book I have ever encountered. A full 189 third of its page count is dedicated to footnotes and bibliography 190 alone.[^30] In an issue swimming in contentious Instagram infographics, 191 Schwartz and Wilf have brought the receipts.[^31] In doing so, however, 192 they interweave theory, history, and proscribed solutions in a manner 193 that leaves the reader with a significantly improved understanding of 194 the conflict but great difficulty summing up this new knowledge. The 195 book desperately needs a more linear structure. 196 197 Additionally, assertions about Palestinian thought are found throughout 198 the book and can be difficult to prove true or false. How would one go 199 about assessing the claim that "the Palestinians' commitment to the idea 200 that they are still refugees and also possess a right of return to the 201 state of Israel is deeply embedded in the Palestinian identity and its 202 collective ethos?"[^32] Schwartz and Wilf proffer that it "is an issue 203 on which no Palestinian political opposition or dissent exists," which 204 is perhaps as good a proxy as you will find.[^33] I don't necessarily 205 doubt that it is correct that there is a cultural narrative of 206 "perpetual injustice" in the Palestinian camp, but I am cognizant of the 207 fact that it is difficult to prove definitively. The book's arguments 208 are made weaker by their occasional reliance on alleged Palestinian 209 beliefs, as opposed to evidence of action. 210 211 Furthermore, the book's critique of the West—which we are led to believe 212 by the subtitle will be severe—is, in essence, that it has failed to 213 sufficiently counter anti-Israel extremism in the Arab world. The book 214 makes a compelling argument that this is the case, and that 215 "geostrategic interests" (read: oil) have muddled what would otherwise 216 be clear opposition to an ideology that seeks to eliminate a UN member 217 state.[^34] Still, this strikes me as a somewhat confusing target for 218 criticism in this case when it may be more appropriate to condemn the 219 Arab extremists themselves. 220 221 With that said: this book managed to significantly change my thinking on 222 the conflict. As someone who thinks about this a fair amount, I would 223 consider that on its face to be a significant endorsement. If that's not 224 enough of an endorsement, here's another one: you should probably read 225 this book. I now realize that I did not at all understand the 226 Palestinian refugee issue before reading this book, and in its aftermath 227 feel confident and prepared in its discussion. Schwartz and Wilf did not 228 challenge my fundamental view of the conflict, but they gave me a much 229 clearer understanding of the refugee issue, which has profound 230 implications. 231 232 *The War of Return* has been a timely read ever since its publication. 233 Indeed, in the ensuing years, very few of the foundational facts and 234 conditions it addresses have experienced any shift; the Arab-Israeli 235 conflict had reached somewhat of a standstill. 236 237 It is the "fervent hope [of Schwartz and Wilf] that in writing this book 238 [they] contribute in a meaningful way to real and lasting peace." As 239 such, their proposals need adjustment.[^35] With the outbreak of the 240 Israel-Hamas War in the aftermath of October 7th, there is potential for 241 a serious shift in the history of the conflict. 242 243 After the war is over, there may be an opportunity—for the first time in 244 a long time—for meaningful change. The parties must move quickly to 245 final-status negotiations, to bring a conclusion to the violence that 246 has plagued our peoples for decades. We can no longer think about slow 247 change. Two states, for two peoples, as originally envisioned by the 248 United Nations in 1947 as "lawful, moral, and legitimate" solution.[^36] 249 In order for that to happen we must be guided, in part, by the book's 250 total refusal of the right of return: 251 252 > When Palestinians complain that recognizing a Jewish state means 253 > relinquishing the right of return, the response should be, "Yes, that 254 > is exactly what it means."[^37] 255 256 If indeed we stand, surrounded by violence, on the precipice of 257 peace—the storm before the calm, if you will—then this book stands to be 258 more relevant than ever. 259 260 --- 261 262 [^1]: In the interest of full transparency, I will admit here that the 263 subtitle begins with the word “How,” which I have not included in the 264 quotation for the purpose of sentence flow. 265 266 [^2]: Literal, ["The War of Return"](https://literal.club/book/the-war-of-return-24grq). 267 268 [^3]: Schwartz and Wilf, *The War of Return*, 55 269 270 [^4]: As you read this review, you may find yourself confused, thinking: 271 "These citations seem to imply that *War of Return* has thousands of 272 pages. That seems unlikely." You would be correct. I read *War of 273 Return* on a Kindle, and thus have had great difficulty finding stable 274 page numbers. Instead, I have provided a "location." You may ask 275 yourself: "How do I use a location?" To which I respond, "This is a 276 question for Amazon." For now, I will simply apologize in advance. 277 278 [^5]: Schwartz and Wilf, *The War of Return*, 131. 279 280 [^6]: Id. at 148. 281 282 [^7]: This is just definitional—you'd get outvoted. You can also look at 283 historical examples: there was no self-determination by Jews in Arab 284 countries, or the United States, or anywhere else that Jews lived. One 285 needs a majority. 286 287 [^8]: Schwartz and Wilf, *The War of Return*, 761. 288 289 [^9]: Id. at 2448. 290 291 [^10]: Id. at 2961. 292 293 [^11]: It is left unaddressed how fledgling Israel would have handled a 294 much larger Arab minority. In the modern day, Israeli Arabs make up 295 around 20% of the population. 296 297 [^12]: Schwartz and Wilf, *The War of Return*, 387. 298 299 [^13]: Id. at 436. 300 301 [^14]: Id. at 907. 302 303 [^15]: Id. at 416. 304 305 [^16]: Id. at 496. 306 307 [^17]: Id. at 1398. 308 309 [^18]: Id. at 2961. 310 311 [^19]: Id. at 1631. 312 313 [^20]: Id. at 1329. 314 315 [^21]: Id. at 1474. 316 317 [^22]: Id. at 1953. 318 319 [^23]: Id. at 2248. 320 321 [^24]: Id. at 3559. 322 323 [^25]: Id. at 3785. 324 325 [^26]: Id. at 3516. 326 327 [^27]: Id. at 2065. 328 329 [^28]: Id. at 2496. 330 331 [^29]: I would like to note, at this point, that there is a lot more to 332 say about UNRWA. In fact, there are probably several books worth of 333 things to be said about UNRWA. If you want to read one such book, you 334 should definitely read *War of Return*! There are comparisons of budget 335 details and staffing numbers between UNRWA and UNHCR, analysis of the 336 success of other major UN revitalization agencies like UNKRA and why 337 that didn't happen with UNRWA, and more. But, for the purpose of this 338 review, we have to move on. Apologies. 339 340 [^30]: I love footnotes. I especially like when they are humorous, 341 instead of just page citations, which I realize this review—much like 342 *War of Return* itself—lacks. So here is one in compensation. 343 344 [^31]: Including but not limited to archives from the UN, Israel, US, 345 UK, and Al Jareeza's Palestine Papers, interviews with high-ranking 346 Israeli politicians and military figures, and a wealth of books, 347 articles, reports, and position papers from throughout the conflict's 348 long history. 349 350 [^32]: Schwartz and Wilf, *The War of Return*, 3246 351 352 [^33]: Ibid. 353 354 [^34]: Id. at 1309. 355 356 [^35]: One such adjustment, if Schwartz and Wilf are taking suggestions, 357 would be to address the rise of the new Israeli right. Netanyahu's 358 current government contains a minister with a conviction for terrorism; 359 their book was published before this latest example of extremism from 360 the Jewish side, and I would hope an updated version would address this. 361 362 [^36]: Schwartz and Wilf, *The War of Return*, 1006. 363 364 [^37]: Id. at 3408.